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MEMORANDUM 
 
TO:    Nancy Dodge, Town Manager, Town of New Shoreham 
FROM:   Jonathan Lew, Sea Grant Law Fellow 
RE:   Old Harbor Land Dispute 
DATE:  May 12, 2007 
 
SUMMARY 
 
A new marina facility proposal has been informally announced for the Old Harbor area 
on Block Island, Rhode Island.  Since the proposal has become public knowledge, issues of 
ownership and validity of title have arisen concerning the property in question.  On June 30, 
2006 a letter from Margaret Comings of the Old Harbor Task Force to the Town Council & 
Planning Board outlined the Task Force’s plan for the proposed board walk and possible hurdles 
that may be faced.  Primarily, the letter indicates that although the town presently has no control 
over the harbor, it would like to take control by “whatever means possible i.e. court cases, 
purchase of land, condemnation, port authority, etc.” 
A review of recent Rhode Island case law and the applicable statutory law indicates that 
condemnation would be the most plausible route for the task force to pursue.  This memo will 
also address the possibility of an action for adverse possession and an action under the public 
trust doctrine.  
 
OWNERSHIP OF THE PARCELS 
Ralph T. Lewis, Master, issued a report naming the owners of the parcels on February 12, 
1986.  Lewis (“master”) named 13 individuals, 2 of whom are now deceased, as the owners of 
Lot 146 of Plat 6.  Ownership of the land in question is broken into 90ths.  The following is a list 
of the owners and their respective shares:  
1. Ruth B. Rose Barrel   - 7/90  
2. Anne Whitney (hackstaff) Garnett - 7/90  
3. Richard A. Gardner Jr.   - 2/90  
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4. Linda Ann Gardner   - 2/90  
5. M.E. Construction Co.  - 18/90  
6. Harriet Phelan    - 15/90  
7. Frank C. Payne Jr.    - 15/90  
8. Anna S. Brewer   - 6/90  
9. Barbara Frances Conlong/A. Taylor - 6/90  
10. Gladys Jones Hodge    - 6/90  
11. Claire Slate Pike   - 3/90  
12. Leslie Dodge Slate   - 1/90  
13. Della B. Slate     - 1/90  
14. Beverly Sharpe Johnson   - 1/90  
CONDEMNATION  
 
Applicable Law: 
 
Section sixteen of the Rhode Island Constitution reads in pertinent part: 
[c]ompensation for taking of private property for public use -- Regulation of 
fishery rights and shore privileges not public taking. -- Private property shall not 
be taken for public uses, without just compensation. The powers of the state and 
of its municipalities to regulate and control the use of land and waters in the 
furtherance of the preservation, regeneration, and restoration of the natural 
environment, and in furtherance of the protection of the rights of the people to 
enjoy and freely exercise the rights of fishery and the privileges of the shore, as 
those rights and duties are set forth in section 17, shall be an exercise of the police 
powers of the state, shall be liberally construed, and shall not be deemed to be a 
public use of private property. R.I. Const., Sec. 16 
 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-64-9: Condemnation Power reads in pertinent part that  
If, for any of the purposes of this chapter, the Rhode Island economic 
development corporation shall find it necessary to acquire any real property, 
 3
whether for immediate or future use, the corporation may find and determine that 
the property, whether a fee simple absolute or a lesser interest, is required for the 
acquisition, construction, or operation of a project, and upon that determination, 
the property shall be deemed to be required for public use until otherwise 
determined by the corporation; and with the exceptions hereinafter specifically 
noted, the determination shall not be affected by the fact that the property has 
been taken for, or is then devoted to, a public use; but the public use in the hands 
or under the control of the corporation shall be deemed superior to the public use 
in the hands of any other person, association, or corporation…. 
The full text of this statue is attached in the appendix to this memorandum.  
 
Analysis: 
 
To successfully condemn, or ‘take’ land for public use, the state must satisfy two 
requirements: (1) the land must be taken for public use; and (2) just compensation must be paid 
to the property owner.” See Parking Co., 892 A.2d at 100.  “The ultimate determination of the 
character of the use or purpose is a judicial and not a legislative question, yet where the 
legislature declares a particular use or purpose to be a ‘public use’ such a declaration must be 
given weight and will control unless the use or purpose in question is obviously of a private 
character.” Narragansett Electric Lighting Co. v. Sabre, 50 R.I. 288, 298, 146 A. 777; City of 
Newport v. Newport Water Corp., 57 R.I. 269, 275, 189 A. 843.  In Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 
135, at 154, 65 L. Ed. 865, 41 S. Ct. 458, the supreme court said that ‘a declaration by a 
legislature concerning public conditions that by necessity and duty it must know, is entitled at 
least to great respect.’” Opinion to Governor, 69 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1949).  In fact, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court made clear in its opinion to the governor that the analysis is fact intensive and 
there is no clear test as to whether the use intended for land is one of a public nature.  History has 
shown, however, that the Court has not shied away from condemning land where the use can be 
shown to benefit the public, whether for economic, environmental, and even recreational use. Id.  
 
Moreover, public necessity can be shown even where the party seeks to “justify 
condemnation of private land for [the] transfer to a private party envision[ing] a scenario where 
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the existence of the transferee's enterprise depends on using land that can only be assembled by 
the government. Referring to such parties as "instrumentalities of commerce," the frequent 
example is the railroad, where only the government's use of eminent domain can avoid the 
pitfalls of the holdout that could derail the construction of the line entirely.”  Colin McNiece, A 
Public Use for the Dirty Side of Economic Development: Finding Common Ground Between 
Kelo and Hathcock for Collateral Takings in Brownfield Redevelopment, 12 Roger Williams U. 
L. Rev. 229, 240 (2006). In Kelo v. City of London, the proposed plan “was intended to create 
jobs, increase tax revenue, make the city more attractive, create recreational opportunities on the 
waterfront, and build momentum for other revitalization efforts.”  Id. at 237.  The proposal at the 
Old Harbor site on Block Island appears to meet this same description.  Not only is a new marina 
a ‘instrumentality of commerce’, it is intended to create recreational opportunities and revive the 
site in a manner only possible through public ownership and management.  The continued 
dispute between the various parcel owners only hinders these efforts.   
 
ADVERSE POSSESSION  
 
Applicable Law: 
 
Under Rhode Island law, to state a claim for adverse possession a complainant must satisfy 
section 34-7-1 of the R.I. General Laws, which states:  
Where any person or persons, or others from whom he, she, or they derive their 
title, either by themselves, tenants or lessees, shall have been for the space of ten 
(10) years in the uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession of 
any lands, tenements or hereditaments for and during that time, claiming the same 
as his, her or their proper, sole and rightful estate in fee simple, the actual seisin 
and possession shall be allowed to give and make a good and rightful title to the 
person or persons, their heirs and assigns forever; and any plaintiff suing for the 
recovery of any such lands may rely upon the possession as conclusive title 
thereto, and this chapter being pleaded in bar to any action that shall be brought 
for the lands, tenements or hereditaments, and the actual seisin and possession 
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being duly proved, shall be allowed to be good, valid and effectual in law for 
barring the action. 
If the elements set forth in the above statute are satisfied, therefore, the claimant has proven that 
good and rightful title will vest in the adverse possessor.  Those elements are: “actual, open, 
notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive for the statutory period of ten 
years.”  See DeCosta v.DeCosta, 819 A.2d 1261 (R.I.2003).   
 
Analysis: 
 
Given the facts of this case, the claimant here will bear the burden of proving that each of 
the elements of adverse possession is present.  The master’s report indicates that previous 
attempts to gain title to this land by adverse possession have failed for lack of evidentiary basis.  
Here, however, if the town can establish that the elements discussed in further detail below are 
met, a successful claim may be asserted in the Superior Court.    
Actual and Continuous:  
 “The elements of actual and continuous are successfully established when the claimant 
shows that ‘the use to which the land has been put is similar to that which would ordinarily be 
made of like land by the owners thereof.’”  See CHRISTOPHER D. DISANO & BRIAN LAPLANTE, 
EFFECTIVE BOUNDARY DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN RHODE ISLAND 30 (2004) [hereinafter 
BOUNDARY DISPUTES], citing Lee v. Raymond, 456 A.2d 1179, 1182 (R.I. 1983).  “Additionally, 
the continuity of the possession must be sufficient to signal the true owner of the land that a 
claim of title contrary to his own is being asserted.”  Id. See also Sherman v. Goloski, 188 A.2d 
79, 84 (1963) (holding that where the land in question is of such a nature as to preclude actual 
occupation thereon, or intense use thereof, the requisite possession may be shown absent those 
uses).   
Open & Notorious:  
 “The ‘notorious’ and ‘open’ elements are established by a showing that the ‘claimant 
goes upon the land openly and uses it adverse to the true owner.  The owner then becomes 
chargeable with knowledge of what is done openly on land.”   BOUNDARY DISPUTES, at 31, citing 
Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 367 (R.I. 1982).  
Hostile: 
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 “A claimant makes a showing that the possession was ‘hostile’ if a determination is made 
‘that the possession of the occupier is to a visible line in all events, regardless of the location of 
the true boundary line.”  BOUNDARY DISPUTES, at 31, citing LaFreniere v. Sprague, 271 A.2d 
819, 822 (R.I. 1970).  
 
Claim of Right & Exclusivity:  
 “Regarding the elements of ‘claim of right’ and ‘exclusivity’, in order for a party to 
successfully defend against an adverse possession claim of disputed land, ‘there would have to 
be evidence indicating that [the record of the subject property] or others had made improvements 
to the land or, at the very least, had used the land in a more significant fashion than merely 
walking across it.’”  BOUNDARY DISPUTES, at 31, citing Gammons, 447 A.2d at 368. 
 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
 
Applicable Law: 
 
Section 17 of the Rhode Island Constitution reads in pertinent part:  
Fishery rights -- Shore privileges -- Preservation of natural resources. -- The 
people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and the 
privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled under the 
charter and usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from the 
shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage 
along the shore; and they shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment 
of the natural resources of the state with due regard for the preservation of their 
values; and it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the 
conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural 
resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to 
protect the natural environment of the people of the state by providing adequate 
resource planning for the control and regulation of the use of the natural resources 
of the state and for the preservation, regeneration and restoration of the natural 
environment of the state. 
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Navigable Waters  
 The public trust doctrine applies only to navigable waters, which are waters subject to 
tidal influence.  “Waters are considered navigable if they can be used in their ordinary condition 
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the 
customary modes of trade and travel on water, and are generally and commonly useful to 
purposes of trade and commerce.” BOUNDARY DISPUTES, at 54, citing Asselin v. Blount, 14 A.2d 
696 (1940).  
 
Analysis: 
 
The public trust doctrine, which came before the Rhode Island constitution, mandates that 
the state hold all lands "below the high-water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the 
public." See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 
1995). Moreover, the public trust doctrine vests within the General Assembly both the authority 
and responsibility to regulate and preserve tidal lands and also to determine the appropriate uses 
for tidal land, grant tidal land to another, or "delegate the authority to regulate that land on the 
state's behalf." See Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259-60 (R.I. 
1999) (citing Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1040). The state's plenary 
authority over tidal lands is nevertheless restricted by article 1, section 17, which preserves "all 
the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore" to the state's inhabitants, "to which they 
have been heretofore entitled under the charter and usages of this state, including but not limited 
to fishing from the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and 
passage along the shore; and they shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the 
natural resources of the state with due regard for the preservation of their values."  State ex rel. 
Town of Westerly v. Bradley, 877 A.2d 601, (R.I. 2005) (citing Town of Warren v. Chamber of 
Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1040).  
 It appears as though the interests that are to be protected by the public trust doctrine are 
in line with those sought to be protected by the town in implementing the proposed marina 
project.  By taking ownership of the land in question the town will be able to regulate and 
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preserve the Old Harbor in the manner that was envisioned even before the Constitution of this 
state was drafted.   
 
 
 
